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Abstract 
This paper provides the background rationale for and description of a prototype culture tool, 
the Soft Factors Modelling Tool (SFMT), which is one of the outputs of a DTC-funded 
research project.  Following an introduction, the paper considers several issues associated 
with autonomy and culture.  A description of the researchers’ Soft Factors Modelling Tool’ 
and its application is provided. 
Keywords: Autonomy, semi/autonomous systems, culture, cultural factors, missions, SFMT 
Introduction 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
provided a stimulus to the development and 
application of unmanned semi-autono-
mous/autonomous vehicles (S/AVs) and 
systems (S/ASs) for surveillance, targeting, 
communications and as weapons platforms.  
S/AVs provide many benefits including 
reduced risks to personnel, more accurate 
and timely intelligence and, in some cases 
reduced costs.  Although S/AVs are un-
manned, humans are involved in system 
design, testing and, depending on the 
degree of vehicle autonomy, operation and 
control of the vehicle. 
Further factors associated with the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan include the increase 
in multinational coalition force groups, the 
large number of operations other than war 
(OOTW), e.g. the building of roads and 
provision of medical facilities to local 
populations, and the requirement to collab-
orate with non-government organisations 
(NGOs) such as aid agencies.  Such multi-
national, multi-organisational situations 
will be a feature of future military scenarios 
that Western countries will be involved in.  
As a result, military command and control 
(C2) systems will have to interact with an 
increasingly wide range of ‘hard’ systems 
(communications equipment, weapon sys-
tems, etc.) and ‘soft’ systems (organis-
ations, rules and regulations, individuals, 
etc.).  Each of the above soft and hard 
systems is developed largely within a 
particular country or region, and subject to 
a particular national culture. 
Semi/autonomous vehicles and systems 
Autonomy is primarily about the locus of 
control and decision-making within a 
system or subsystem (i.e. its degree of in-
dependence from higher level interference). 
For the purposes of this paper, a semi/-
autonomous system (S/AS) is considered to 
be a configuration of technical components 
(vehicle, weaponry, external communica-
tion and control systems, etc.) and non-
technical components (people, rules, 
procedures, etc.). 
Humans are expected, for the foreseeable 
future, to retain ultimate responsibilities for 
strategic mission planning, control and 
decision making with regard to the operat-
ional deployment of autonomous vehicles 
and systems.  However, the location of the 
control interface and the allocation of 
decision-making autonomy within the 
system will vary from system to system 
depending on factors such as the embedded 
intelligence within the overall system, the 
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task requirements, mission complexity, 
environment and personnel.  
The American Department of Defense 
utilises a 10-point scale of autonomous 
capability levels (ACLs), from ‘remotely-
guided’ to ‘fully autonomous swarms’.  On 
this scale, the Predator is at point 2, and 
Global Hawk is a little higher.  The UK’s 
Taranis unmanned combat air vehicle 
(UCAV) demonstrator is designed to be 
capable of higher autonomy than these, as it 
is required to plan multiple targets and to 
defend itself against enemy aircraft.  
The basic hypothesis of the Loughborough 
research project is that the human decision-
making behaviour required in S/AS is 
directly impacted by the cultural factors 
described later in this paper and, as such, 
these factors must be taken into account 
during the design and operational config-
uration of S/AS.   
Cultural influences on autonomy 
Some cultural traits are inherent in the 
design of technical systems, and the degree 
of autonomy assigned to them.  As an 
example, the French-dominated Airbus 
company and the American Boeing com-
pany have different design philosophies, 
which are largely products of their differing 
cultures.  The French view their engineers 
as an elite group, and the aircraft is there-
fore designed to function effectively with a 
minimum level of input from the pilot - i.e. 
to possess a high level of autonomy.  
However, American pilots epitomise the 
independent American stereotype; therefore 
the plane is designed to be on a more 
interactive footing with the pilot.   As a 
result, Airbus and Boeing differ in their 
approaches to fly-by-wire (FBW).  In both 
cases, computers are inserted between the 
pilot and the flight controls, engine 
controls, etc., but the ultimate levels of 
autonomy and control are different. 
In the case of the A320 and later Airbus 
models, the flight envelope protection 
provided by the FBW system retains 
ultimate control at all times - the pilot can-
not fly outside the normal predefined flight 
envelope [1]; under certain conditions, the 
FBW computer will make further decisions 
(e.g. that the plane is landing), and override 
the pilot inputs, (e.g. for more power).  In a 
Boeing 777, the pilot can always override 
the system, although strong warnings will 
be given; this allows the aircraft to be 
flown outside the standard flight envelope 
in emergencies.   
The preferences of pilots for one or the 
other system also tend to be strongly biased 
by their culture.  Western pilots, in partic-
ular Anglo-Saxon pilots, generally prefer 
the Boeing model, and tend to have doubts 
about increased computerisation of flights 
in general, as they consider that it leaves 
pilots less alert and less able to respond to 
emergencies.  Eastern pilots tend to prefer 
increased computer control of flights. 
An understanding of the impact of national 
and other cultural traits on overall system 
behaviour will provide greater insight as to 
the levels of system autonomy that can be 
achieved in a given set of circumstances.  
The effects of culture on people 
Hofstede [5] defines culture as: 
“the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one 
human group from another  ... includes 
systems of values; and values are among 
the building blocks of culture”  
This implies that the acquisition of culture 
is an unconscious, subtle process, which 
leaves people with only a limited awareness 
of culture’s influence on their behaviour.   
Hofstede [5] states that there are three 
broad perspectives on culture as depicted in 
Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Hofstede’s perspectives on culture 
The implication of Figure 1 is that the areas 
amenable to changes in what Hofstede 
termed their ‘cultural values’ are at the 
individual and the collective culture levels, 
where value is seen as ‘a broad tendency to 
prefer certain states of affairs over others’.   
The three cultural perspectives (sources of 
cultural influence) are described further 
below: 
1. National (or ethnic) culture:  National 
or ethnic culture is usually a product of 
heritage religion, history, language, 
climate, population density, availability of 
resources, politics, etc.  National culture 
affects attitudes and behaviours, for 
example with regard to leadership and 
communication styles, criticism, attitudes 
to rules and trust. 
National culture is usually acquired during 
the formative years and is therefore 
difficult to change significantly later in life. 
2. Professional culture:  Professional cul-
ture is usually manifested in its members 
by a sense of community and by the bonds 
of a common identity.  Features associated 
with professional culture can include 
jargon, restricted entry, prestige, resistance 
to change and binding norms of behaviour. 
3. Organisational culture:  Organisational 
culture arises out of the history of the 
organisation, its leadership, products or 
services, etc.  Although there will be a 
common layer across the organisation, in 
the case of multinationals, significant 
differences will emerge due to differing 
national cultures.  These will appear as 
differing leadership styles, manager-sub-
ordinate relationships, etc. 
Organisational culture is more amenable to 
carefully-planned change than are either 
professional or national cultures.  Organis-
ational culture channels the effects of the 
other two cultures into standard working 
practices, therefore changes to it that are 
sympathetic to national culture can bring 
significant performance benefits. 
The measurement of culture 
In order to predict the performance of 
individuals, groups and systems on the 
basis of their cultures, we must have 
relevant cultural ‘yardsticks’.  Researchers 
have produced several overlapping sets of 
cultural factors (also called cultural attrib-
utes or cultural dimensions); these are 
typically described in terms of two extr-
emes of a scale.  Research by Hofstede 
[5,6], Trompenaars [10], Trompenaars & 
Woolliams [11], the GLOBE study [7] and 
others have identified several highly 
influential ‘core’ cultural factors.  Three of 
these are listed below: 
• Individualism vs. collectivism 
• Low vs. high power distance 
• Masculinity vs. femininity 
There is still only limited agreement 
between researchers as to a more compreh-
ensive set of cultural factors, some of 
which are listed below: 
• Low vs. high uncertainty avoidance 
• Mastery vs. fatalism 
• Power by achievement vs. power by 
status 
The Loughborough researchers have 
chosen a set of factors that appear relevant 
for military missions and scenarios. 
 
INDIVIDUAL
COLLECTIVE
UNIVERSAL
• Unique 
• Part genetic 
• Part learned, e.g. 
individual 
• Common 
• Genetic 
• Pre-programmed, 
   e.g. laughing, 
• Shared 
• Learned, e.g. 
national, professional 
& organizational culture
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Air accidents and cultural factors 
Following Hofstede’s large study of 
managers across IBM’s international 
operations [5], many more focused studies 
have been carried out, in particular in the 
field of aviation.  
Even taking account of differing fleets, 
facilities and training, there is considerable 
variance in commercial air transport safety 
across national cultures.  In particular, coll-
ectivist cultures (see later) tend to have a 
high power distance; this hinders communi-
cation and has resulted in many avoidable 
accidents.  Most commercial aircraft are 
designed in individualist countries, and in-
corporate cultural assumptions about their 
users, in particular the flight crews [3].  It is 
becoming increasingly clear that these ass-
umptions do not fully meet the needs of 
non-individualist cultures.  The Airbus 
‘model’ is a closer fit to the collectivist 
pilot than the Boeing ‘model’ is (see 
earlier).  
A number of studies have been carried out 
on military aircraft, in particular a compar-
ative study by Soeters and Boer of 14 
NATO air forces using, in many cases 
similar aircraft and undergoing similar 
training [9].  In this article, strong positive 
correlations were found between the three 
cultural factors listed below and increased 
accident rates: 
• Collectivism (or low individualism) 
• High power distance 
• High uncertainty avoidance. 
See the next section for a brief description 
of two of the above cultural factors.  
Overview of the cultural factors used in 
the SFMT 
There are currently nine cultural factor 
pairs in the SFMT v2.   Of the nine factors, 
five can only be exhibited by human 
agents, and four factors can be exhibited by 
both human (i.e. non-technical) and tech-
nical (i.e. software and hardware) agents, as 
shown in Figure 2.   
Cultural factors can relate to a single 
system (e.g. an individual or missile 
launcher), a group of sub-systems (e.g. a 
troop or a communications infrastructure) 
or an overall system (e.g. the army or the 
full set of assets carrying out a mission).   
Proactive Orthodox
Individualism Collectivism
Universalism Particularism
Time synchronization Time sequencing
Power-by-achievement Power-by-status
Low power distance High power distance
Low risk taking High risk taking
Masculinity Femininity
Attributable to 
human (non-
technical) 
agents
Attributable to 
both human 
(non-technical) 
and technical 
agents
Mastery Fatalism
 
Figure 2: Soft factor (cultural factor) pairings 
Each factor is described in terms of two 
extremes (representing extreme scores from 
a range of possible values), with a descrip-
tion of the likely beliefs, perceptions, etc., 
manifested at each extreme end.  Individ-
uals and other agents select a position in 
between, but rarely occupy the absolute 
extremes in all contexts.   It should be rem-
embered that the factor scores, of them-
selves, are not right or wrong, merely more 
or less appropriate given a required level of 
performance in a particular environment. 
There is insufficient space to provide a 
detailed description of all the cultural fac-
tors used in the SFMT, but two truncated 
examples are presented below.  Details of 
other cultural factors are provided in 
Hodgson & Siemieniuch [4].  
•    Individualism vs. collectivism:  This 
refers to the balance struck between 
individuals and groups.  In individual-
istic societies, ties between individuals 
(other than immediate family members) 
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tend to be loose; an individualist takes 
responsibility for his or her actions, 
tends to speak directly and factually and 
is willing to argue and to question 
others’ views.  Generally, individualists 
tend to exhibit a higher level of trust 
than collectivists.  In collectivistic 
societies, individuals are integrated into 
closely knit groups, often in the form of 
extended families; in return for un-
questioning loyalty, they gain the 
group’s protection.  People from out-
side the group tend to be treated with 
suspicion.  Collectivists try to avoid 
direct, confrontational approaches and 
find criticizing others difficult.  Hierar-
chies tend to be rigid, and losing face is 
to be avoided at all costs. 
• Low power distance vs. high power 
distance is about the relationships 
between subordinates and superiors.  In 
low power distance organisations, 
decisions are more likely to be made by 
agents with appropriate knowledge and 
experience, irrespective of roles; 
inequality of agent roles is a matter of 
tradition and convenience and can 
change within an operational environ-
ment.  Superior officers/agents rely on 
experience and on lower ranking 
personnel/agents, and lower ranking 
agents expect to be consulted.  Decis-
ions can be questioned and over-ridden 
in particular circumstances.  In high 
power distance organisations, there are 
centralised decision structures and a 
high concentration of authority.  
Decisions are made by agents in 
authority based on their roles in the 
organisation, and are despatched down-
wards through the organisation; the 
inequality of agent roles reflects reality.  
Superior officers/agents rely on 
CONOPS, procedures, etc., and lower 
ranks/agents expect to be told – decis-
ions are rarely questioned and never 
overridden in any circumstances.  
Privileges and status symbols for higher 
ranks/agents are expected. 
The Soft Factors Modelling Tool 
As part of the research project activity, 
several prototype culture tools have been 
built to investigate the feasibility of cap-
turing and applying information relating to 
culture and its effects on system perform-
ance.  The early web-based tools are descr-
ibed in further detail in [2] and [8].  This 
section of the paper will concentrate prim-
arily on the latest prototype version of the 
Soft Factors Modelling Tool (SFMT v2).  
The detailed cultural factors have been 
changed more than once in the SFMT v2 
and, as a result, the model has been adapted 
to enable rapid, simple factor removal or 
addition. 
The intended users of the SFMT v2 are 
mission planners who are required to put 
together a set of resources (comprising 
human and technical components) to carry 
out a mission in a particular environment.  
The culture tool could be utilised in order 
to answer a question such as the following 
example: 
“ Is a particular configuration of military 
assets tasked with carrying out a mission, 
capable of demonstrating appropriate 
decision-making, communication, adaptive 
skills and behaviour in an environment 
where the command style is control free, 
authority is delegated, operational tempo is 
unpredictable and the battlespace is ill-
defined?” 
The SFMT v2 enables mission planners and 
other leaders or managers to enter estimates 
of the positions of mission resources with 
regard to the SFMT’s nine cultural pairings 
(see Figure 2).  They can enter up to three 
sets of values, e.g. representing platoon 
members, platoon leader and C2. 
 Following entry of these estimates, feed-
back is presented to the user(s), highlight-
ing potential conflicts between the actual 
(estimated) cultural attribute values and the 
values considered to be optimum for the 
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mission (or environment) and for the 
desirable behaviours for that mission 
Impact of cultural factor values on the 
environmental performance 
Clearly, military environments will vary 
considerably in terms of climate, topog-
raphy, etc.  However, variations will also 
occur in terms of the context within which 
military operations will take place.  The 
researchers believe that agents or systems 
exhibiting certain positions on the cultural 
factor pairings will inhibit or facilitate 
agent or system performance in an environ-
mental context exhibiting certain charac-
teristics.  
Figure 3 illustrates an exemplar section of 
the ‘environment master sheet’ (note that, 
due to space limitations, only two of the 
nine cultural factors and three of the eight 
environment classes are included).  This 
sheet provides the estimates of the optimum 
required cultural factor scores for each of 
the environment class characteristics for 
any mission environment requirement, i.e. 
it relates cultural factors to various environ-
mental/organisational characteristics.  
Environment  
class Class characteristics
Individualism
 (-5) vs. 
C
ollectivism
 (5)
U
niversalism
 (-5) vs. 
Particularism
 (5)
Centralised structure 2 -1
Decentralised structure -3 -2
Authoritative/interventionist 2 NA
Collaborative/control free -2 NA
Formal communication structure NA NA
Informal communication structure NA NA
Strong directive leadership 0 NA
Consensus based leadership -3 NA
Stovepiped function distribution 2 NA
Dispersed function distribution -2 NA
Centralised authority over actions 2 NA
Delegated authority over actions -3 NA
Largely heterogenous systems -2 -1
Largely homogeneous systems NA NA
Largely heterogenous SOPs -2 -1
Largely homogeneous SOPs NA NA
Command 
structure and style
Function/ 
authority/  skills 
distribution
Degree of 
interop'ity
 
Figure 3: A section of the environment master 
As an example of the use of the environ-
ment master sheet, if the authority distrib-
ution is required to be ‘centralised 
authority over actions’ then the ‘ideal’ 
individualist-collectivist score is +2, imply-
ing a position towards the collectivist end 
of the scale; however, if the authority 
distribution is required to be ‘delegated 
authority over actions’, then the ideal score 
is -3, implying a position towards the 
individualist end of the scale. 
Note that the environment master sheet is 
stable, and does not change with changing 
missions. 
Impact of cultural factor values on the 
desired behaviour 
It is believed that certain combinations of 
cultural factor values facilitate or inhibit 
certain types of decision-making behaviour. 
Figure 4 illustrates an exemplar section of 
the ‘behaviour master sheet’ (note that, due 
to space limitations, only two of the nine 
cultural factors and three of the eight 
behavioural categories are included).  This 
sheet provides the estimates of the optimum 
cultural factor scores for each of the 
behaviour traits, i.e. it relates cultural 
factors to various behaviours.  
As an example of the behaviour master 
sheet’s use, if a mission requires a soldier 
to ‘say what you mean and mean what you 
say’, then a cultural factor score (-4) 
towards the individualist, rather than 
collectivist end of the scale would be pref-
erable; however, if the requirement was to 
‘convey meaning indirectly’, a more collec-
tivist soldier (+2) would be preferable.  
Note that the behaviour master sheet is 
stable, and does not change with changing 
missions. 
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Skill  class Desired behaviour
Individualism
 (-5) vs. C
ollectivism
 
(5)
U
niversalism
 (-5) vs. Particularism
 
(5)
Say what you mean, mean what you say -4 -3
Convey meaning indirectly/diplomatically 2 1
Handle/dispel conflict NA NA
Ability to trust and be trusted -3 -3
Willingness to collaborate/co-operate NA NA
Transparency/openness -3 -3
Process information rapidly NA NA
Deal with ambiguity, contradictions & uncertainty NA NA
Deal with complexity NA NA
Deal with incomplete information -2 NA
Objective analysis of technical data NA NA
Prioritise information NA NA
Sharing information -3 -3
Ability to deal with risk -3 NA
Deal with variable time pressures NA NA
Willingness to take decisions -3 NA
Will follow orders and CONOPS 2 2
Act autonomously -3 -2
Recognises mistakes/takes action -3 NA
Decision making
Communication / 
interaction skills
Information 
processing
 
Figure 4: A section of the behaviour master 
Using the SFMT 
The SFMT requires users to enter three sets 
of information:  
1. The cultural factor scores of indiv-
iduals, groups and/or systems:  For 
example individualism vs. collectivism, 
low vs. high power distance.  These are 
entered in a table by scoring them (from 
-5 to +5) on the nine cultural factor 
scales.  Both the actual scores (based 
on knowledge of the agent(s)) and the 
perceived desirable scores may be 
entered. 
2. The environmental requirements of 
the proposed mission or actual 
scenario:  For example command 
structure & style, function/authority/-
skills distribution.  These are entered on 
a data input sheet that lists all the 
environment master class characteris-
tics, enabling the user to define the 
environment or mission. 
3. The behavioural requirements placed 
on those involved in the specific 
mission or scenario:  For example the 
required communication/interaction 
skills, information processing skills and 
decision-making.  These are entered on 
a data input sheet that lists all the 
behaviour master class characteristics, 
enabling the user to define the 
behaviour requirements. 
Although an SFMT exercise requires a 
significant amount of information (see 1 to 
3 above), some or all of the information 
may be available from previous exercises.  
For example, a platoon and its leader may 
previously have been ‘culturally assessed’ 
for other missions; the environmental requ-
irements or behavioural requirements for 
this mission may have been assessed and 
used with another group of people.   
Following entry of the three sets of infor-
mation, the SFMT calculates the differ-
ences between the various agents’ cultural 
scores (1) and the optimum scores in the 
master sheets for the environmental (2) and 
behavioural requirements (3) as specified in 
the three sets of information.  
The SFMT presents the following analysis 
for the specified mission or environment: 
• Individual, average and overall cultural 
misalignment to mission and/or 
environment. 
• Major cultural mismatches between up 
to three individuals or groups. 
• Unusual patterns of culture factor 
scores for any agent, for example, it is 
unlikely that a highly collectivist agent 
would have a very low power distance 
score. This facility provides a useful 
check for input errors. 
Sample results can be seen in Figure 5 
(summary environment results) and Figure 
6 (summary behaviour results). A ‘traffic 
light’ system is used to highlight output 
values as green, amber or red, depending 
on whether they are within or outside an 
acceptable range.  
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Environment  
class Class characteristics
JT, R
N
, K
M
 
&
 PK
M
alcolm
 
R
eid
B
rigade H
Q
JT, R
N
, K
M
 
&
 PK
M
alcolm
 
R
eid
B
rigade H
Q
Centralised structure 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.2 0.9
Decentralised structure 2.8 0.3 2.4 1.3 0.8 1.5
Authoritative/interventionist 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.1 1.2 0.8
Collaborative/control free 2.7 0.4 2.2 1.1 0.8 1.4
Formal communication structure 0.4 1.4 0.0 1.1 1.2 0.8
Informal communication structure 2.3 0.5 1.9 0.7 0.5 1.4
Strong directive leadership 1.1 2.2 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.0
Consensus based leadership 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.8
Stovepiped function distribution 0.2 1.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.1
Dispersed function distribution 3.2 0.4 2.0 0.7 0.4 0.4
Centralised authority over actions 0.6 1.8 0.3 1.4 1.5 1.3
Delegated authority over actions 2.3 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.7 1.1
Largely heterogenous systems 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Largely homogeneous systems 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Largely heterogenous SOPs 1.3 0.5 2.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
Largely homogeneous SOPs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Clear role and task definition 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7
Fuzzy role and task definition 2.5 0.6 2.6 1.0 0.6 1.3
Tightly defined rules of engagement 1.7 2.4 1.0 2.3 2.1 3.0
Broader rules of engagement 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Small well defined battlespace 1.8 2.8 0.8 2.8 2.5 3.3
Large unbounded battlespace 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Predictable 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.2
Unpredictable 2.1 0.9 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.1
Reasonably static 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rapid changes 2.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2
Less than adequate 1.7 0.6 1.9 0.7 0.6 1.4
Adequate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Long horizon 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
Short horizon 2.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.6 1.1
Ad-hoc 1.8 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.0 1.1
Preconceived 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.8
Offensive warfare 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5
OOTW - peacemaking 2.1 1.1 2.5 0.9 0.9 1.3
OOTW - peacekeeping 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.3 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.7
ENVIRONMENT DISCREPANCY SCORESDESIRABLE
Resource 
availability
AS-IS
Operation tempo
Degree of 
interop'ity
Strategic purpose
Decision making
Function/ 
authority/  skills 
distribution
Command 
structure and style
Overall mean discrepancy scores:  
Degree of 
uncertainty
 
Figure 5: Example of analysis results for 
environment 
The summary table traffic light system 
illustrated in Figure 6 shows that there are 
problems with the as-is behaviour of the 3rd 
agent (Brigade HQ).  Subsequent exam-
ination of the detailed tables (not shown in 
this paper) will reveal the key mismatches 
for this agent. 
Skill  class Desired behaviour
JT, R
N
, K
M
 
&
 PK
M
alcolm
 
R
eid
B
rigade H
Q
JT, R
N
, K
M
 
&
 PK
M
alcolm
 
R
eid
B
rigade H
Q
Say what you mean, mean what you say 1.6 0.4 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.1
Convey meaning indirectly/diplomatically 0.8 3.6 0.8 0.7 2.2 0.8
Handle/dispel conflict 3.7 1.7 1.5 0.3 0.7 0.1
Ability to trust and be trusted 3.3 1.4 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.1
Willingness to collaborate/co-operate 3.5 2.1 2.1 0.7 0.7 1.5
Transparency/openness 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Process information rapidly 2.0 0.0 4.8 3.0 0.2 0.8
Deal with ambiguity, contradictions & 1.6 0.6 3.5 0.7 1.2 0.8
Deal with complexity 0.9 1.5 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Deal with incomplete information 2.5 0.5 5.0 1.8 0.9 0.9
Objective analysis of technical data 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.1
Prioritise information 1.5 3.6 0.3 1.8 2.8 2.4
Sharing information 4.0 1.2 3.8 1.2 0.6 2.0
Ability to deal with risk 2.2 0.5 2.9 1.3 0.8 1.3
Deal with variable time pressures 0.8 0.4 2.0 0.4 0.4 0.0
Willingness to take decisions 1.2 0.8 3.8 0.5 0.8 2.3
Will follow orders and CONOPS 2.2 3.1 1.8 2.9 2.6 2.8
Act autonomously 1.3 0.4 1.8 0.8 0.9 1.0
Recognises mistakes/takes action 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 0.8
Ability to motivate others 2.3 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.0
Ability to delegate 0.0 0.5 4.3 0.0 0.5 2.0
Ability to direct others 0.5 2.1 0.3 1.0 2.1 0.5
Sets the standards for performance 1.8 0.5 2.5 1.3 1.4 1.0
Willingness to take risks 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.5
Ability to balance risk 1.8 2.3 3.2 0.8 0.7 0.5
Can self-organise, reconfigure 4.0 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.3
Capable of learning from action/result 2.8 1.6 4.0 0.6 0.5 0.7
Physical orientation from external cues 2.5 3.5 0.2 2.0 2.5 0.6
Cognitive orientation from external cues 1.3 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0
Social orientation from external cues 0.8 2.0 0.3 0.6 1.2 0.2
Robustness 3.2 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
Resilience 2.0 0.8 1.4 0.0 0.8 0.4
Responsiveness 2.6 0.3 2.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
Flexibility 2.6 0.3 3.0 0.3 0.3 0.6
Adaptability 3.2 0.4 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.4
Cognitive preparedness 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.2
Flexibility in action 3.4 1.2 4.2 1.0 0.6 1.8
Analytical thinking 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.4 1.9 2.6
Holistic thinking 0.3 2.5 2.0 0.5 2.5 1.0
Concrete reasoning 2.0 2.0 1.5 3.3 2.0 2.0
Hypothetical reasoning 0.0 0.1 2.3 0.0 0.5 0.4
3.0 1.7 3.6 1.5 1.4 1.7
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Figure 6: Example of analysis results summary 
for behaviour 
Applications of the SFMT to-date 
The SFMT has been applied to a number of 
historical case study military scenarios 
where information about the types of pers-
onnel, mission details and outcomes were 
known and where it was considered that 
culture played a key role in performance 
and outcomes. The scenarios included 
elements of the British Army in the Bos-
nian War, the USS Vincennes incident and 
the UK Sierra Leone actions.  These applic-
ations demonstrated the validity of the 
model (no inexplicable results) and the 
levels and areas of warning emerging from 
the SFMT were in general alignment with 
the known results. 
In addition, the SFMT has been applied to a 
small UK design company, using the 
services of a person who was not familiar 
with the SFMT package.  The outcomes 
highlighted some of the issues that were 
known to be present in the company.  
The SFMT would benefit from application 
by military subject matter experts (SMEs), 
but this has not been possible to-date. 
Limitations of the SFMT 
At present, the SFMT deals with each agent 
separately, highlighting ‘mismatches’.  
Ideally we would in some cases wish to 
pick a group of agents which, together, 
would match the requirements of the 
environment or mission. 
Much culture-related research has taken 
place over the last thirty years, but no 
definitive set of cultural factors has 
emerged as a ‘clear winner’, although there 
are perhaps three or four outstanding 
candidate cultural factors.  As a result, the 
SFMT uses more cultural factors (9) than 
are ideal (perhaps 4 or 5). 
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Conclusions 
A second version of the soft factors mod-
elling tool (SFMT) has been implemented 
as an Excel-based package and has been 
evaluated in several scenarios.  The pack-
age has been structured to enable rapid 
update of the soft (cultural) factors in the 
light of improved knowledge gained from 
subject matter experts. However, the tool 
still requires this subject matter expert-
based testing to take place in order to 
enable a detailed analysis of its capabilities 
and limitations.  
There is, as yet, no clear, comprehensive 
set of cultural factors that meet all require-
ments, and researchers have to pick and 
choose those that appear to be the ‘best fit’.  
The Loughborough researchers have based 
their work on the detailed mainstream 
literature on culture, and also on literature 
produced by military organisations.  
The research described in this paper has 
produced an improved understanding of the 
impact that different configurations of 
cultural attributes can have on the potential 
mission performance of agents.  
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